language: en

Software Deviation Analysis: A "Safeware" Technique

Jon Damon Reese and Nancy G. Leveson
Dept. of C.S.E. Safeware Engineering Corp. University of Washington
7200 Lower Ridge, Unit B Box 352350 Everett, WA 98203, U.S.A. Seattle, WA 98195, U.S.A.
{jdreese,leveson}@cs.washington.edu {jdreese,leveson}@safeware-eng.com

Abstract Standard safety analysis techniques are often ineffective when computers and digital devices are integrated into plant control. The Safeware methodology and its set of supporting safety analysis techniques (and prototype tools) includes modeling and hazard analysis of complex systems where the components may be a mixture of humans, hardware, and software. This paper describes one of the Safeware hazard analysis techniques, Software Deviation Analysis, that incorporates the beneficial features of HAZOP (such as guidewords, deviations, exploratory analysis, and a systems engineering approach) into an automated procedure that is capable of handling the complexity and logical nature of computer software.

[This work was partly funded by NASA/Langley Grant NAG-1-1495, NSF Grant CCR-9396181, and the California PATH Program of the University of California, in cooperation with the California Department of Transportation and the U.S. Department of Transportation.]